A design of secure and e cient public-key encryption schemes under weaker computational assumptions has been regarded as an important and challenging task. As far as ElGamal-type encryption schemes are concerned, some variants of the original ElGamal encryption scheme based on the weaker computational assumption have been proposed. For instance, security of the ElGamal variant of Fujisaki-Okamoto public-key encryption scheme and Cramer and Shoup's encryption scheme is based on the decisional Di e-Hellman assumption (DDH-A). However, security of the recent scheme, such as Pointcheval's ElGamal encryption variant, is based on the computational Di e-Hellman assumption (CDH-A), which is weaker than DDH-A.
1 Introduction
Encryption Schemes Based on Di e-Hellman Assumption
Ever since Di e and Hellman 10] originally proposed the concept of public-key cryptosystem, extensive research has been performed in this eld. In particular, the public-key encryption scheme proposed by ElGamal 11] has attracted considerable attention. When ElGamal proposed his public-key encryption scheme, it was widely believed that the security of this scheme is based on the \computational Di e-Hellman assumption".
Roughly speaking, the computational Di e-Hellman assumption says that for a cyclic group G, an adversary who sees g x and g y cannot e ciently compute g xy . In this paper, we assume that the G is de ned as the multiplicative group of a nite eld modulo a large prime p, i.e., Z p where g is a generator for a subgroup Z q of Z p and x; y 2 Z q . Note here that q is a large prime such that qjp ? 1. It is true that the security of ElGamal encryption scheme is based on the computational Di e-Hellman assumption in a passive attack model, where an adversary cannot decrypt a ciphertext (g y ; mg xy ) of a message m without computing g xy . However, indistinguishability 14], which has been accepted as a general security notion of encryption schemes, does not require an attacker to decrypt the whole message. In the notion of indistinguishability, security of encryption scheme implies that an adversary cannot distinguish ciphertexts of two chosen messages. Consequently, it seems that the security of ElGamal encryption should depend on some stronger assumption rather than the computational Di e-Hellman assumption. In fact, Tsiounis and Yung 16] have shown that the security of ElGamal encryption scheme is not based on the Di e-Hellman assumption but based on the stronger Decisional Di e-Hellman assumption (DDH-A). DDH-A says that an adversary who sees two distributions (g x ; g y ; g xy ) and (g x ; g y ; g z ), where z is a randomly chosen from Z q and the length of g z is the same as that of g xy , cannot distinguish these two distributions. Hence the Di eHellman assumption is often called the computational Di e-Hellman assumption (CDH-A) for the purpose of emphasizing an adversary's inability to compute the Di e-Hellman key, g xy . Throughout this paper, we will use the term CDH-A to refer to the Di e-Hellman assumption.
Chosen Ciphertext Security
Ever since Zheng and Seberry 17] initiated a full-scale research on the adaptive chosenciphertext attack, the design of public-key encryption schemes has trended toward the prevention of these attacks. In the adaptive chosen-ciphertext attack, an adversary is permitted to access a decryption function as well as an encryption function. The adversary may use this decryption function on ciphertexts chosen before and after obtaining the challenge ciphertext, with the only restriction that the adversary may not ask for the decryption of the challenge ciphertext itself.
Several security notions on the (adaptive or non-adaptive) chosen-ciphertext attack in-cluding non-malleability 9] were formalized and the relationship among them has been shown We note here that the underlying computational assumption of Cramer-Shoup scheme is DDH-A, which is believed to be stronger than CDH-A, even though the random oracle model is not used in this scheme. The situation remains the same in the ElGamal version of the rst F-O scheme. However, the ElGamal variant of recent Pointcheval's scheme and Fujisaki and Okamoto's ElGamal variant using the integration of asymmetric and symmetric encryptions are based on CDH-A. On the other hand, compared to the original ElGamal scheme, these schemes have a disadvantage in a sense that the length of the ciphertext is expanded.
Based on aforementioned discussions, we propose another ElGamal encryption variant provably secure against chosen-ciphertext attack in the random oracle model and its elliptic curve version. The underlying computational assumption of the proposed schemes are based on CDH-A and EC-CDH-A, but the length of the ciphertext is shorter than those of other schemes based on CDH-A.
The organization of this paper is as follows: We brie y review the notions of chosenciphertext security for public-key encryption schemes in Section 2. In Section 3, we describe the proposed schemes and analyze their security. In Section 4, comparison of the proposed scheme with other ElGamal variants is provided and concluding remarks will follow in the nal section.
Some Preliminaries
In this section, we brie y review the concepts of the \indistinguishability-chosen plaintext attack (IND-CPA)" 3] and the \plaintext awareness (PA)" 3]. Security against the chosen-plaintext attack for public-key encryption schemes is de ned by using the following experiment: Let A be an adversary with two algorithms A 1 and A 2 .
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The \ nd"-stage algorithm A 1 is run on the public key, pk. Our motivation for constructing the public-key encryption scheme whose security relies on CDH-A is to apply random oracle G to Di e-Hellman key g xy . Since G is assumed to be a random oracle, G(g xy ) does not reveal any (partial) information about g xy . Hence, to gain any advantage, the adversary must compute g xy . Also, to provide PA, we apply another random oracle H to message m concatenated by some random string s. This motivation leads to the proofs for the theorems provided later in this section. A concrete description of the proposed scheme 1 
Elliptic Curve Variant
EC-CDH-A (elliptic curve computational Di e-Hellman assumption) is similarly de ned as CDH-A. EC-CDH-A says that for a nite group G 0 of points on elliptic curve E, an adversary who sees aP and bP cannot e ciently compute abP. Often, E is de ned on a Galois eld of characteristic 2 or a prime number. Here, P is a point of order q on E, where q is a large prime such that qj#G 0 (the order of G 0 ). The following description assumes that the de ning eld of E is a Galois eld of characteristic a prime number p. Note that in order to obtain more computational e ciency using the particular scalar multiplication method such as Frobenius expansion described in 7], the de ning eld can be altered.
Elliptic Curve Variant 2 = (K; E; D)
Key generator K { Choose a non-supersingular elliptic curve de ned on Galois eld GF(p), E(GF(p)), and calculate the order of E(GF(p)), #E(GF (p)). Let q be a large prime number dividing #E(GF (p)) and let P be a point of order q on E(GF(p)).
{ pk = (E; P; q; W(= uP)) and sk = (E; P; q; u) where u 2 R GF(q) and jpj = k = k 0 + k 1 
Security Analysis
In this section, we show that our ElGamal encryption variant is secure in the sense of IND-CPA under CDH-A and there exists a knowledge extractor K. Note that the security in the sense of IND-CPA and the existence of a knowledge extractor imply the security in the sense of PA. By the result of 3], this implies security against the adaptive chosen-ciphertext attack (IND-CCA2) Theorem 1 If there exists an adversary attacking the encryption scheme 1 = (K; E; D) in a chosen-plaintext scenario, then we can construct an adversary that breaks CDH-A in the random oracle model with non-negligible probability.
Proof: Let A = (A 1 ; A 2 ) be an adversary attacking 1 = (K; E; D) in a chosen-plaintext scenario and be an advantage of A. Recall With probability 1=q G , the Q-th query to G is X y , i.e., the probability that X y is asked to G at the Q-th query is lower-bounded by (1=q G )( ? q H =2 k 1 ). Hence if the advantage of A is non-negligible, B breaks CDH-A with non-negligible probability. { Now we construct a knowledge extractor K. Note that the existence of K implies security in the sense of PA under the assumption that 1 is secure in the sense of IND-CPA. Theorem 2 Let B be an adversary for PA. Then there exists a knowledge (k)-extractor K and hence 1 = (K; E; D) is secure in the sense of PA.
Proof: Since we have shown that 1 is secure in the sense of IND-CPA, we only need to construct a knowledge-extractor K. Assume that gG = f(g 1 ; G 1 ); (g 2 ; G 2 ); : : : ; (g q G ; G q G )g, hH = f(h 1 ; H 1 ); (h 2 ; H 2 ); : : : ; (h q H ; H q H )g (all the random oracle query-answer pairs of B), C = fy 1 ; y 2 ; : : : ; y E g (a set of ciphertexts that B has obtained from the interaction with the random oracles and the encryption oracle), y = ( ; ) = 2 C (a ciphertext produced by B which is not in C), and the public key X are given to K. The knowledge extractor K works as follows:
K considers all the query-answer pairs gG and hH, respectively, and checks that there exist pairs (g u ; G u ) and (h v ; H v ) such that y = ( ; ) = (g Hv ; G u h v ) and g u = X Hv . We summarize the cryptographic characteristics of four schemes in Table 1 .
As can be seen from the table, the proposed scheme guarantees sound security and length-e ciency. Under the CDH-A, it is secure in the sense of IND-CCA2. We now provide a more detailed explanation on the length of a ciphertext. In the F-O scheme, the length of a ciphertext is 2k. A ciphertext of the proposed scheme has the same length as those of the original ElGamal scheme and the F-O scheme, when the length of output of G, which is used as the random oracle, is set to k. In the Pointcheval's scheme, the length of ciphertext is expanded to 3k. Compared with the Pointcheval's scheme, the proposed scheme e ectively reduces the length of a ciphertext under the same circumstances, i.e., the security of both schemes is based on CDH-A and two random oracles are used. Note that the message to one ciphertext ratio (a measure for how many lengths of plaintext can be encrypted per a ciphertext) the original ElGamal scheme is the largest since no additional random string follows the message m being encrypted. However, as widely known, the original ElGamal scheme is insecure against chosen-ciphertext attack. Note that the message to ciphertext ratios of other three schemes are the same. As also can be seen from the table, the computation cost required in the proposed scheme to encrypt and decrypt messages is estimated to be the same as that of the Pointcheval's scheme. Note that we have omitted the computation required to generate public key.
Finally, we mention about implementation of the random oracle G. To implement this function, one can use the heuristic method described in 4] and 5] as follows:
G(X y ) = g(h0i; X y )jjg(h1i; X y )jjg(h2i; X y )jj : : : ; where g is an e cient cryptographic hash function such as SHA-1 or MD5 which outputs 160 bits or 128 bits, respectively, and the notation hii denotes a binary 32-bit word encoding of integer i.
Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we have proposed another ElGamal encryption variant whose security is based on CDH-A and its elliptic curve version whose security is based on EC-CDH-A, both of which are much weaker than DDH-A and EC-DDH-A (the elliptic curve decisional Di eHellman assumption), respectively. Moreover, the lengths of a ciphertext of the proposed scheme is reduced compared with the recent Pointcheval's ElGamal variant, which is based on CDH-A. Also, the proposed scheme provides the same degree of computational e ciency as other proposed schemes.
However, as done in other practical schemes, the random oracle model is employed to provide provable security. A construction of \practical" public-key encryption schemes secure against active adversaries without random oracle other than the one in 8] is an interesting and meaningful future work.
